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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether competition in the Japanese banking sector has improved in 
the last quarter of the 20th century.  By estimating the first order condition of profit 
maximization, together with the cost function and the inverse demand function, we found 
that competition had improved, especially in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s.  
The results fail to reject a Cournot oligopoly for city banks for most of the period, while 
they do reject it for regional banks for the overall period.  This suggests that competition 
among city banks was stronger than that among regional banks. 
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1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether competition in the Japanese banking 
sector has improved in the last quarter of the 20th century.  Over this period, a regulated 
system for the Japanese banking sector that had dominated in Japan over the high growth 
period has been substantially liberalized.  This period includes the bubble period of the late 
1980s, and the long stagnation in the 1990s in which private banks struggled with huge 
non-performing loans.  As a result, we expect that the degree of competition in the 
Japanese banking sector has changed throughout this period. 
There have been a few studies, to our knowledge, that have investigated the degree of 
competition in Japanese financial industries.  Molyneux, Thornton, and Lloyd-Williams 
(1996) estimated the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic of Japanese banks in 1986 and 
1988.  They found that the Japanese banking sector was in monopoly equilibrium in 1986, 
whereas in 1988 it was in monopolistic competition equilibrium.1  Following Clark and 
Davies (1982), Alley (1993) estimated a degree of collusion in the Japanese banking sector 
to find a high degree of collusion in 1986 and 1987.  Souma and Tsutsui (2000) applied an 
approach similar to that of this paper to the Japanese life insurance industry from 1986 to 
1997 to find that the degree of competition was low, but that the industry became more 
competitive after 1995 when the New Insurance Industry Law was promulgated.  
Kamesaka and Tsutsui (2002) estimated Panzar-Rosse’s H-statistic for the Japanese 
                                                  
1 De Bandt and Davis (2000) argue that estimates of cross-section analysis often change sharply, so 
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securities industry to find that the industry was in monopoly equilibrium in the 1980s and 
was in monopolistic competition equilibrium in the 1990s. 
We assess the degree of competition by direct estimation of the first order condition of 
profit maximization.  This is essentially the method that is formalized by Bresnahan (1982) 
and Lau (1982), and has been applied to many studies.2  For example, Shaffer (1989, 1993), 
Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), and Zardkoohi and Fraser (1998) applied this method to the 
banking industries in the U.S. and Canada.  The method uses time-series data, and 
therefore only elucidates a long-run average degree of competition.  In contrast, we use 
panel data, which enable us to investigate short-run changes in the degree of competition.3 
The next section reviews the history of the liberalization in the Japanese banking 
sector.  In section 3, we present a model for an estimation of the degree of competition.  
In section 4, we explain our data and present the empirical results.  Section 5 is devoted to 
checking the robustness of the results.  In section 6, we investigate what elements had 
critically affected the degree of competition.  Section 7 provides the conclusion. 
 
2.  Liberalization of the Japanese Banking Sector 
The liberalization of the Japanese banking sector was caused, at least partially, by the 
enormous issuance of government bonds from the early 1970s.  Initially all the newly 
                                                                                                                                                         
that the results may suffer from some problems. 
2 See Bresnahan (1989, 1997) for the development of this method. 
3 Angelini and Cetoreli (1999) analyzed Italian banks with panel data for 1983-97 to estimate the 
Lerner index. 
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issued government bonds were bought by private banks, and one year later the Bank of 
Japan purchased all of them.  Therefore, few bonds circulated outside the banking sector.  
After 1970, however, the issuance of government bonds became so large that the Bank of 
Japan could not purchase all of them.  The government bonds were issued at a high price, 
and therefore the private banks that bought them suffered enormous losses.  The banks 
demanded that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) deregulate the selling of bonds to the market, 
and the MOF began to relax the restriction in 1977.  Consequently, a secondary market for 
government bonds rapidly emerged.  The emergence of a large free financial market was a 
major event that significantly affected the Japanese banking sector in that the market 
enabled the securities companies to offer a mutual fund that could compete with deposits.4  
This situation might have promoted some dis-intermediation.  A greater degree of 
disintermediation did not occur because the issuance amount of the mutual fund was 
regulated so that securities companies were prevented from meeting the potential demand 
such funds.  Nevertheless, it is probable that the emergence of the secondary government 
bond market applied greater competitive pressure on the Japanese banking sector.5 
The next important liberalization was that of deposit interest rates.  Jumbo time- 
deposits and Money Market Certificates were introduced in 1985.  The interest rates of the 
former were not regulated, and those of the latter were tied to market interest rates.  
                                                  
4 The medium-term government bond fund was the main brand of mutual fund. 
5 The threat of dis-intermediation was also created by the revision of the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Act in 1980, which facilitated investors’ access to foreign markets. The 
internationalization of the financial markets was promoted over 1980–85. 
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However, with respect to these deposits, the minimum amount that could be deposited was 
restricted.  For example, in 1985, each jumbo time deposit account was required to hold an 
amount of more than one billion yen.  This restriction was gradually relaxed up until 1992.  
In 1994, all the deposit interest rates were deregulated.  However, interest rates fell rapidly 
from 1991 to 1996, suggesting that banks might not have been under deposit interest rate 
competition. 
On the other hand, loan interest rates seem to have moved more freely since 1973.  In 
Figure 1, we show loan interest rates over the period 1956 to 2001.  Loan interest rates 
apparently began to change more sharply from 1973.  Table 1 shows that the coefficient of 
variation of loan interest rates jumped from 0.055 in the high growth period (1961–1972) to 
0.20 in the low growth period (1973–1983).  The correlation coefficient between loan 
interest rates and the call rate increased from 0.80 to 0.91 in the same period, while the 
coefficient of variation of the call market did not change substantially during this period.  
These facts suggest that the market environment for Japanese banks drastically changed in 
the late 1970s, which may have affected competition among them. 
In 1993, regulation regarding the segregation of business lines in financial industries 
was relaxed.  Banks and securities companies were allowed to enter each other’s 
businesses by establishing subsidiaries.  Although banks established many securities 
company subsidiaries based on this deregulation, no securities companies established bank 
subsidiaries.  This is probably because banks had stronger business power than securities 
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companies in Japan.  Therefore, this deregulation did not have a significant effect on the 
banking sector, contrary to the case for the securities industry. 
 
3.   Model 
We assume that a bank i  raises funds id  from depositors and invests it to loans iq  and 
government bonds ib .  Thus, the profit of the bank i  at time t  is: 
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competition, whereas titi S ,, =θ  for Cournot competition.  From (3) and (4), we obtain:6 
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game equilibria whose one-shot game is Cournot oligopoly. 
Rearranging (5) and defining titti qPR ,, ≡  to represent the revenue of bank i generated 
by loans, we obtain the following equation: 
   
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
titi
d
titi
t
t
ti q
C
q
d
C
qqrRR
,
,
,
,
,
,,,,, ∂
∂+∂
∂++= η
θ . (6)
tθ  represents the degree of competition.  Note that we have dropped out the subscript i  
for θ  in order to capture the industry average degree of competition.7 
Because the marginal cost is not observable, we assume the translog cost function: 
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where tiw ,  stands for the wage rate of bank i , 
C
ti,ε  is an error term, and variables 
with upper bars are the deviations from their means.  Given equation (7), our regression 
                                                  
6 Equation (3) can be estimated instead of equation (5).  Estimation of equation (3), however, did 
not generate reasonable results.  The reason for the poor results may be that, in the estimation, we 
should use as btir ,  the data for securities including stocks, instead of the data for government bonds, 
because the revenues from government bonds are not reported.  In Japan, however, considerable 
parts of stocks are held as the mutual holding, which is not determined based on the short-run 
incentives.  In addition, although bond yields should include capital gains and losses, they are not 
incorporated in the reported data of br .  Therefore, we present the results based on equation (5). 
7 See Bresnahan (1989) for this point. 
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equation is specified as: 
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where Sti,ε  is the error term. 
We identify tθ  from tη  using information from the loan demand function.  The 
following inverse loan demand function is assumed:8 
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where tIIP  is the index of industrial production, tiASL ,  the average size of loans 
of bank i , tiSMSF ,  the ratio of the amount of loans to small- and medium-sized firms to 
total loans, tiOPL ,  the ratio of the amount of loans to operation funds to the total loans, and 
D
ti ,ε  is a disturbance term.9  Simultaneous estimation of (7), (8), and (9) gives the estimates 
of tθ  and tη .10 
Expected signs are shown under the coefficients.  The expected sign of 3b  is 
negative because increasing the loan size lowers average operation costs, resulting in lower 
                                                  
8 Here, we assume that loans are heterogeneous, so that their interest rates differ based on their size, 
riskiness, and maturity.  This assumption contradicts the derivation of equation (3), which assumes 
homogeneity of loans.  At the sacrifice of this theoretical disparity, we obtain an identification of 
θ  from. η . 
9 Total loans are divided into two parts: operation funds and equipment funds.  While borrowers 
use the former for the short-term operation of their businesses, the latter are used for capital 
investment. 
10 We conducted the analysis using GDP instead of IIP.  The results were quite similar. 
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interest rates.  The sign of 4b  is expected to be negative, because loans to smaller firms 
are often riskier.  Since operation funds are generally advanced by shorter loans than 
equipment funds, the sign of 5b  depends on the shape of the yield curve of the term 
structure of interest rates.  As the yield curve is usually increasing, we expect that it is 
negative. 
A merit of the estimation method of this paper is that by using panel data, it gives the 
estimates of the degree of competition every year, which enables us to investigate the 
short-term changes in the degree of competition.  On the other hand, the method proposed 
by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) only reveals the average degree of competition for a 
long period, because it uses aggregated time series data. 
 
4. Results 
4.1  Data 
We select regional banks and city banks as samples.  Long-term credit banks, trust banks, 
and smaller cooperative institutions such as shinkin banks are excluded from the analysis for 
the following reasons.  The former two types of banks are not ‘ordinary banks’ and their 
operations are substantially different from those of city and regional banks.  The smaller 
cooperative institutions generally operate in small areas.  Kano and Tsutsui (2003) found 
that loan markets of shinkin banks are segmented by prefecture, implying that they compete 
within each prefecture.  Other cooperative institutions, credit cooperatives and agricultural 
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and forestry cooperatives, are much smaller, so they probably compete within more limited 
areas.  Therefore, the analysis of these institutions should require a somewhat different 
methodology than that applied in this paper, which should be interesting as a future study. 
Regional banks, together with city banks, constitute ‘ordinary banks’.  Legally, 
regional banks are not distinguished from city banks, but they form their own business 
organizations.11  They differ from city banks in that they are much smaller and basically 
operate in restricted areas.  However, Kano and Tsutsui (2003) found that the loan markets 
of regional banks are not segmented by prefecture.  In 1996, their share of the loan market 
in Japan was 33.1%.12 
City banks have nation-wide branch networks and operate diversified businesses, 
including international bank business, while regional banks tend to be specialized in 
traditional deposit-loan business.  In 1996, city banks’ share of the loan market in Japan 
was 49.6%.  Thus, by analyzing regional and city banks, we cover 82.7% of the total 
amount of loans of Japanese banks.  We estimate the model with separate samples because 
city and regional banks have different production functions and their markets are somewhat 
segregated. 
We used panel data of city banks and regional banks for the estimation.  All the data 
were extracted from Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File, except for those of tIIP , 
                                                  
11 Regional banks consist of regional banks and second regional banks.  The latter were converted 
from mutual banks during 1989–92, and had previously been specialized financial institutions for 
small- and medium-sized firms. 
12 The total loan outstanding in Japan is defined as the sum of city banks, long-term credit banks, 
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which were extracted from the Nikkei NEEDS Macro Data File.  The list of the data used 
for each variable is: 
tiR , : loan interest revenue for bank i  at time t , 
tiq , : outstanding balances of loan for bank i  at time t , 
tQ : sum of tiq ,  over city banks or regional banks at time t , 
tid , : outstanding balances of deposit for bank i  at time t , 
tiC , : operating costs for bank i  at time t , 
d
tir ,  = (interest paid for deposit) / (total amounts of deposit) for bank i  at time t , 
tiw ,  = (personnel expenses + welfare expenses) / (the number of employees) for bank i  at 
time t , 
ti
ti
ti q
R
P
,
,
, ≡  : loan interest rates for bank i  at time t , 
tiASL ,  = tiq ,  / (the number of loans for bank i  at time t ), 
≡tiSMSF ,  (the amount of loans to small- and medium-sized firms) / tiq , , 
≡tiOPL ,  (the amount of loans for operation funds) / (the amount of loans for operation 
funds + that for equipment funds) for bank i  at time t , 
tIIP : index of industrial production at time t . 
The estimation period is from fiscal 1974 to fiscal 2000.  After excluding 
observations that lack some data, the number of observations each year is 9–13 for city 
banks and 116–131 for regional banks.  The total number of observations is 318 for city 
                                                                                                                                                         
trust banks, regional banks, shinkin banks, and credit cooperatives. 
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banks and 3441 for regional banks.13  Until 1980, banks reported financial statements twice 
a year, in September and March, so we constructed annual data of flow variables as the sum 
of the semi-annual data.  Data at the end of each fiscal year, i.e., March, are used for the 
stock variables. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2.  The results reveal that 
city banks are much larger than regional banks.  For example, city banks have outstanding 
loans and deposits that are 15 times larger, on average, than regional banks.  City banks 
earn 15 times as much as regional banks and pay 1.3 times the salary to each employee, on 
average.  Regional banks tend to lend smaller amounts to each borrower, and are more 
likely to lend to small- and medium-sized firms. 
We use year dummy variables to estimate tθ  in equation (8).  To estimate 
tη
1  in 
equations (8) and (9), we use time dummy variables for every two years.14  We cannot use 
time dummy variables for each year because they are linearly dependent with tIIP . 
Equations (7), (8), and (9) are simultaneously estimated by multivariate regression 
(MVR) and three-stage least squares (3SLS).15   In 3SLS we use rank variables as 
instrumental variables for the terms including tiq , , ,,tid tiR , , 
d
tir , , ,,tiP  and tiC , , the 
                                                  
13 For 1999 and/or 2000, there are some observations that lack data of ASL and/or OPL.  Deletion 
of them results in only two observations for city banks in 2000.  Therefore, for both city and 
regional banks, we complement these data by copying the latest available data to include these 
observations in the sample. To check the possible bias due to this expediential method, we conduct 
the estimation by deleting the two explanatory variables from the demand function.  The estimation 
results are essentially unchanged. 
14 We use a one-year dummy for 1974. 
15 Since equation (7) is not necessary for identifying θ  from η , we estimated only equations (8) 
and (9) jointly.  The results were generally unreasonable, suggesting that equation (7) plays an 
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exogenous variables, tiw , , tiASL , , tiSMSF , , tiOPL , , and tQ , and year dummies.
16 
 
4.2  Estimation results of city banks 
Results of the simultaneous estimation of equations (7), (8), and (9) for city banks are 
presented in Table 3.  In the left columns, the estimates by MVR are shown.  As for the 
cost function, four coefficients out of ten are significant at a 5% level of significance.  As 
for the demand function, the coefficient of IIPt is significantly positive and that of lnQt is 
significantly negative, confirming that the demand function (9) is identified from the supply 
relation (8).  The estimates of 
tη
1  took on a value of around 0.7 and were significant for 
all the years.  However, the estimate of b4 unexpectedly took on a negative value.  This 
may be interpreted as meaning that the small- and medium-sized firms that could obtain 
loans from city banks were promising firms and not riskier than large firms. 
In the right columns of Table 3, the estimates by 3SLS are shown.  They are similar 
to those by MVR, but the results of the cost function are not convincing: the coefficient of 
lnd is non-positive, casting some doubt on the results. 
The estimates of tθ  by MVR are depicted in Figure 2 together with their 95% 
confidence interval.  The value of 1/n is also depicted as a proxy of Cournot oligopoly.  
The results from 3SLS are quite similar so they are not presented here.  For the first two 
                                                                                                                                                         
important role in identifying the marginal cost part in equation (8). 
16 The rank variable of Xi is the variable whose value is the order of Xi ranked in ascending order.  
(See Maddala, 1977, pp. 297-298.) 
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years, 1974 and 1975, the results reject n=θ , 1=θ , and 0=θ , at a 5% significance level.  
tθ  generally had a downward trend, with a spike in 1981, until 1984.  It stayed around 
zero for 1984–1989, and rose in the first half of the 1990s, rejecting perfect competition for 
these years.  In the middle of the 1990s, tθ  again took on a value around zero, while it 
rose again in the final few years.  In summary, competition improved until 1984, and the 
competitive environment obtained until 1997.  Cournot oligopoly was not rejected for most 
of the period.  Perfect competition was not rejected for about half of the period. 
 
4.3  Estimation results of regional banks 
Results of simultaneous estimation of equations (7), (8), and (9) for regional banks are 
presented in Table 4.  The results by MVR are shown in the left columns.  All the 
estimates of the cost function are significant except for that of the quadratic term of deposits.  
A problem is that the coefficients of wln  (and 2)(ln w ) are negative.  We suspected that 
the wage rate might be an endogenous variable and conducted 3SLS estimation using a rank 
variable of tiw ,  as an instrumental variable.  However, the signs of the coefficients did not 
change. 
The estimates of the demand function significantly satisfy the expected signs except 
for that of operation funds.  The estimates of 
tη
1  took on a value around 0.43 and were 
significant for all the years.  Fits are good for all the equations: the coefficient of 
determination exceeds 0.93. 
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Figure 3 shows the MVR estimates of tθ  together with their 95% confidence interval.  
During the entire sample period, n=θ , 1=θ , and 0=θ  were all rejected.  This implies 
that the degree of competition was less severe than Cournot oligopoly, although it was more 
severe than joint profit maximization.  tθ  declined from 1974 to 1987, and the decline was 
especially rapid in the 1970s, implying that competition improved during this period.  tθ  
then rose to around 0.35 and did not change from 1988 to 1998.  It rose again markedly 
after 1998. 
In summary, the degree of competition improved from the 1970s to 1987, and was stable 
during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  Competition has recently become 
laxer. 
The 3SLS estimates shown in the right columns of Table 4 are not remarkably 
different from those generated by MVR.  However, the 3SLS estimates of tθ  are smaller 
than the MVR estimates in the early period. 
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, we find that competition among city banks has 
been stronger than among regional banks.  The result is plausible because the business 
areas of regional banks are limited, even though they overlap, so that they may possess 
monopolistic power in their areas. 
The results of the basic estimations are summarized as follows: First, competition in 
the Japanese banking sector had improved in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s.  
Second, the degree of competition is higher for city banks than for regional banks.  Third, 
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the loan market for city banks has been perfectly competitive during the 1980s and the mid 
1990s.  Fourth, the loan market for regional banks has never been perfectly competitive or 
a Cournot oligopoly, while joint profit maximization is also rejected.  Fifth, competition 
became laxer again after 1998. 
 
5.  Robustness Checks of the Basic Results 
In this section, we provide a check on the robustness of the results in the previous section. 
 
5.1  Cost of capital 
Although the model in this paper indicates that the deposit interest rate is the relevant 
financial cost of the loan, this outcome depends on the assumption that the bank manipulates 
only the amount of deposit.  If the bank manipulates all the liability side including capital, 
the deposit interest rate dtir ,  in equation (7) should be replaced with the cost of capital r , 
which is defined as: 
capital
profitcurrent
capitaldebt
capital
debt ofamount 
debtfor  paidinterest
capitaldebt
debt
+++ , 
where debt consists of deposits, certificate of deposits, call money, borrowing from 
other financial institutions, including the Bank of Japan, etc. 
The estimates of tθ  using r  are shown in Figure 4 (city banks) and Figure 5 
(regional banks).  Figure 4 is quite similar to Figure 2 except for the period after 1992.  
tθ  was significantly negative in the middle of the 1990s and in 1999.  Figure 5 shows 
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more variability after 1995 than does Figure 3.  Together with the fact that the current 
profits of many banks were negative in these periods, these results may imply that it is 
inappropriate to use the cost of capital as calculated above.  However, the conclusions in 
the previous section are confirmed with this analysis. 
 
5.2  Bank reserves 
The model in this paper disregards the existence of reserves for deposits.  If we introduce 
bank reserve R and assume that it is a constant ratio of deposit, i.e., DR β= , equation (8) 
becomes: 
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 (8)’ 
Estimation of equations (7), (8)’, and (9), tθ  for regional banks is shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 resembles Figure 3, but close inspection reveals that the curve shifts downwards, 
so that tθ  took on a negative value in 1987.  Estimates of tθ  for city banks are not 
reasonable and not presented: tθ  is negative for most of the period, and although it 
decreases until 1984, it rises after 1990 and takes almost the same value in the 1990’s as in 
the 1970s. 
We construct the data of β  as money plus reserves divided by deposits.  The mean 
of β  is about 0.1, which is much larger than the required reserve ratio.  This implies that 
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banks held large excess reserves.  Our assumption of a constant reserve ratio is therefore 
irrelevant, which may be the reason we could not obtain reasonable results for city banks. 
 
5.3  Adding a constant term 
One might question why equation (8) has no constant term.  Although the theory does not 
allow for a constant term, it is not unusual to include it in empirical analysis.  The fact that 
there is no constant term may make θ  critically dependent on the level of interest rates in 
equation (8). 
The estimation with the addition of a constant term to equation (8) reveals that this 
speculation is wrong.  The basic results, presented in Tables 3 and 4, and in Figures 2 and 3, 
are confirmed by the estimation with a constant term. 
 
6.  What Affects the Degree of Competition? 
In this section, we investigate what factors relate to the degree of competition.  In 
particular, clarifying which element of financial liberalization promoted competition in loan 
markets is an interesting agenda.  As described in section 2, three important events are 
recognized in the financial liberalization in Japan, i.e., the emergence of a huge government 
bond market, the deregulation of deposit interest rates, and the deregulation of the 
segregation of business lines in the financial sector.  We regress the degree of competition 
obtained in section 4 on variables representing these elements in order to find their 
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influences.  As a proxy for the first element, we employ the trading amount of government 
bonds (BTRADE).  We adopt the ratio of time deposits with unregulated interest rates to the 
total time deposits (FREEDEP) as the data of the second element.  The variable is 
calculated separately for city banks and regional banks.17  As for the third element, we use 
a year dummy (SEGDUM), which takes the value of zero until 1993, and unity thereafter. 
The degree of competition may be affected by various other factors, which should be 
added as explanatory variables in the regression equation.  The first candidate for these 
factors is the effect of the business cycle.  We use the composite index (CIX) to represent 
this factor.  The real GDP growth rate (GDP) and inflation rates (INFL) are also examined 
as alternatives to CIX.  The second element is the market structure of the loan market.  
The Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis predicts that the less concentrated the 
market, the more competitive it becomes.  The efficiency structure hypothesis proposed by 
Demsetz (1973), however, predicts the opposite relationship.  We use the Herfindahl index 
of city banks and regional banks (HI) as a measure of market concentration. 
In view of these arguments, our regression equation is 
    
,)( 6,54
3,210,
ktkttt
ttkttk
REGDUMHIINFLandGDPorCIX
SEGDUMFREEDEPBTRADE
ααα
ααααθ
+++
+++=
             (10) 
where k = city or regional banks, and REGDUM is the dummy variable 
representing regional banks. 
                                                  
17 For regional banks, only the data for the first regional banks are used, since the second regional 
banks were undergoing conversion from mutual banks, and the data was not available during 
1989–1991. 
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The estimation results are shown in Table 5.  The benchmark case using CIX is 
shown in the left columns.  The coefficient of BTRADE is significantly negative at a 5% 
level, implying that the emergence of a government bond market promoted competition in 
loan markets.  In contrast, the coefficients of FREEDEP and SEGDUM are not significant, 
suggesting that deregulation of deposit interest rates and the segregation of business lines 
did not promote competition in the loan markets. 
The business condition, CIX, did not systematically affect the degree of competition.  
The coefficient of the Herfindahl index is not significant either.  The coefficient of 
REGDUM is significantly positive, implying that competition among regional banks is laxer 
than that among city banks. 
In the right columns, the results of the case where GDP and INFL substitute for CIX 
are shown.  In this case, the coefficient of INFL is significantly positive at a 1% level, 
while that of GDP is insignificant.  Thus, competition becomes laxer when the inflation 
rate is higher.  The other results are the same as for the benchmark case. 
In summary, the analysis of this section suggests the following.  First, the emergence 
of the government bond markets promoted competition in loan markets, but the deregulation 
of deposit interest rates and the segregation of financial business lines did not have an 
impact on competition.  Second, competition among regional banks is laxer than that 
among city banks.  Third, the business conditions did not systematically affect the degree 
of competition except for the inflation rate.  Nor did the market structure. 
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7.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigated whether competition in the Japanese banking sector has 
improved in the last quarter of the 20th century.  By estimating the first order condition of 
profit maximization, together with the cost function and the inverse demand function, we 
estimated the degree of competition of city and regional banks.  The results reveal that 
competition had improved during the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s.  This 
corresponds to the period where the secondary market for government bonds emerged.  In 
support of this view, the follow-up analysis of the factors affecting the degree of 
competition demonstrates that the trading volume of the government bonds significantly 
affected the degree of competition. 
The results also reveal that Cournot oligopoly cannot be rejected at a 5% significance 
level for city banks for most of the period, while the results do reject it for regional banks 
over the entire period.  This suggests that competition among city banks was stronger than 
that among regional banks, which is consistent with our intuition. 
The results are richer and more extensive than those obtained in earlier studies on the 
competitiveness of the Japanese banking sector, such as Molyneux, Thornton, and 
Lloyd-Williams (1996), and Alley (1993), which analyzed only a short period of time using 
different methods. 
Souma and Tsutsui (2000) found that although competition in the Japanese life 
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insurance industry became stronger after 1995, it was still close to perfect collusion in 1997.  
Kamesaka and Tsutsui (2002) found that the Japanese securities industry was in monopoly 
equilibrium in the 1980s and was in monopolistic competition equilibrium in the 1990s.  In 
view of these results, the banking industry seems more competitive than the securities and 
life insurance industries in Japan. 
Although most of the results were convincing, there is one question left unanswered: 
why did the degree of competition tθ  rise again after 1998?  One possible interpretation 
is that Japanese banks suffered from huge non-performing loans in the 1990s, and that they 
have been faced with financial crisis since 1997.18  Consequently, they do not have enough 
strength to compete with each other, and want to avoid severe competition, which often 
leads to a cut in their profits.  The clarification of this speculation regarding laxer 
competition in the late 1990s should constitute an interesting study in the future. 
                                                  
18 Three large banks failed in 1997 and 1998. 
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Table 1.  Variation and Correlation of Loan Interest Rates and the Call Rate 
 
High growth period Low growth period 
 
Variation Correlation Variation Correlation 
Short term loan 
Interest rate 0.055 0.20 
Call rate 0.21 
0.80 
0.25 
0.91 
 
Note: The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation over the mean.  The high 
growth period is from December 1961 to December 1972, for which the number of observations is 
133.  The low growth period is from January 1973 to March 1983, for which the number of 
observations is 123. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
City banks 
Variables Mean 
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R 756262 542198 117803 2941256 
P 0.059 0.020 0.020 0.105 
C 205908 112701 38034 525323 
q 14984300 11363200 1453931 43751900 
d 17077500 11938000 1734864 46946000 
dr  0.041 0.017 0.001 0.101 
w 8.404 2.738 3.135 15.126 
ASL 111.432 354.046 8.224 2185.624 
SMSF 0.478 0.133 0.040 0.785 
OPL 0.740 0.086 0.190 0.945 
Number of Observations 318   
     
Regional banks 
Variables Mean 
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R 47311 49299 2209 632901 
P 0.058 0.019 0.005 0.094 
C 20636 17365 817 128085 
q 962380 1070126 25922 9040438 
d 1229090 1340053 31388 9814217 
dr  0.031 0.015 0.002 0.060 
w 6.278 1.951 1.167 11.899 
ASL 12.079 5.389 3.384 51.748 
SMSF 0.796 0.118 0.156 1.894 
OPL 0.684 0.082 0.203 0.901 
Number of Observations 3441   
 
Note: Refer to the main text for a definition of the variables.  R, C, q, d, w, and ASL are measured 
in one million yen.  P, dr , SMSF, and OPL are ratios. 
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Table 3.  Results of simultaneous estimation of eqs. (7), (8), and (9): 
city banks 
MVR 3SLSParameter 
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
θ 1974 0.353 [.001] 0.297 [.006] θ 1975 0.348 [.001] 0.261 [.010] 
θ 1976 0.228 [.007] 0.178 [.046] 
θ 1977 0.208 [.013] 0.115 [.176] 
θ 1978 0.097 [.199] 0.016 [.850] 
θ 1979 0.125 [.047] 0.085 [.210] 
θ 1980 0.227 [.001] 0.157 [.011] 
θ 1981 0.245 [.000] 0.222 [.003] 
θ 1982 0.047 [.217] 0.001 [.985] 
θ 1983 0.094 [.026] 0.072 [.132] 
θ 1984 -0.025 [.446] -0.045 [.262] 
θ 1985 0.041 [.208] 0.016 [.654] 
θ 1986 0.020 [.547] 0.002 [.951] 
θ 1987 -0.036 [.258] -0.054 [.182] 
θ 1988 -0.002 [.941] -0.026 [.458] 
θ 1989 -0.028 [.188] -0.027 [.372] 
θ 1990 0.042 [.012] 0.023 [.223] 
θ 1991 0.108 [.000] 0.082 [.003] 
θ 1992 0.124 [.000] 0.101 [.004] 
θ 1993 0.184 [.000] 0.133 [.003] 
θ 1994 0.092 [.006] 0.057 [.117] 
θ 1995 -0.005 [.862] -0.056 [.167] 
θ 1996 -0.024 [.475] -0.050 [.296] 
θ 1997 -0.007 [.822] -0.040 [.407] 
θ 1998 0.151 [.002] 0.136 [.044] 
θ 1999 0.262 [.000] 0.215 [.009] 
θ 2000 0.185 [.001] 0.152 [.024] 
a 0 12.090 [.000] 12.094 [.000] 
a 1 0.678 [.000] 0.947 [.000] 
a 2 -0.677 [.326] 1.201 [.469] 
a 3 0.110 [.166] -0.113 [.629] 
a 4 -1.928 [.007] 0.311 [.860] 
a 5 -0.459 [.000] -0.545 [.000] 
a 6 -0.099 [.611] -0.171 [.741] 
a 7 0.412 [.148] -0.893 [.255] 
a 8 1.308 [.059] -0.697 [.681] 
a 9 -0.540 [.061] 0.687 [.396] 
b0 5.917 [.014] 5.995 [.032] 
b2 1.053 [.000] 1.063 [.000] 
b3 0.000 [.780] 0.000 [.633] 
b4 -0.291 [.000] -0.294 [.000] 
b5 0.070 [.470] 0.109 [.262] 
1/η 1974 0.707 [.000] 0.715 [.000] 
1/η 1975-76 0.710 [.000] 0.718 [.000] 
1/η 1977-78 0.723 [.000] 0.731 [.000] 
1/η 1979-80 0.709 [.000] 0.717 [.000] 
1/η 1981-82 0.700 [.000] 0.708 [.000] 
1/η 1983-84 0.704 [.000] 0.712 [.000] 
1/η 1985-86 0.709 [.000] 0.717 [.000] 
1/η 1987-88 0.711 [.000] 0.719 [.000] 
1/η 1989-90 0.691 [.000] 0.698 [.000] 
1/η 1991-92 0.691 [.000] 0.699 [.000] 
1/η 1993-94 0.712 [.000] 0.719 [.000] 
1/η 1995-96 0.729 [.000] 0.737 [.000] 
1/η 1997-98 0.736 [.000] 0.743 [.000] 
1/η 1999-00 0.747 [.000] 0.755 [.000] 
R2 for (7) 0.961 0.951  
R2 for (8) 0.843 0.852  
R2 for (9) 0.949 0.950  
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Table 4.  Results of simultaneous estimation of eqs. (7), (8), and (9):  
regional banks 
MVR 3SLS Parameter 
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
θ 1974 0.624 [.000] 0.380 [.000] θ 1975 0.511 [.000] 0.274 [.000] 
θ 1976 0.473 [.000] 0.226 [.000] 
θ 1977 0.365 [.000] 0.137 [.000] 
θ 1978 0.407 [.000] 0.165 [.000] 
θ 1979 0.487 [.000] 0.261 [.000] 
θ 1980 0.389 [.000] 0.247 [.000] 
θ 1981 0.264 [.000] 0.135 [.000] 
θ 1982 0.334 [.000] 0.200 [.000] 
θ 1983 0.323 [.000] 0.193 [.000] 
θ 1984 0.239 [.000] 0.142 [.000] 
θ 1985 0.242 [.000] 0.160 [.000] 
θ 1986 0.259 [.000] 0.187 [.000] 
θ 1987 0.180 [.000] 0.148 [.000] 
θ 1988 0.337 [.000] 0.307 [.000] 
θ 1989 0.365 [.000] 0.335 [.000] 
θ 1990 0.282 [.000] 0.283 [.000] 
θ 1991 0.337 [.000] 0.314 [.000] 
θ 1992 0.338 [.000] 0.304 [.000] 
θ 1993 0.274 [.000] 0.246 [.000] 
θ 1994 0.392 [.000] 0.376 [.000] 
θ 1995 0.285 [.000] 0.316 [.000] 
θ 1996 0.391 [.000] 0.413 [.000] 
θ 1997 0.381 [.000] 0.417 [.000] 
θ 1998 0.563 [.000] 0.555 [.000] 
θ 1999 0.693 [.000] 0.698 [.000] 
θ 2000 0.720 [.000] 0.722 [.000] 
a 0 9.637 [.000] 9.635 [.000] 
a 1 0.178 [.000] 0.575 [.000] 
a 2 0.316 [.000] 0.837 [.000] 
a 3 0.698 [.000] 0.288 [.000] 
a 4 0.146 [.102] 0.807 [.000] 
a 5 -0.263 [.000] -0.239 [.000] 
a 6 -0.393 [.000] -0.140 [.358] 
a 7 0.226 [.000] -0.672 [.000] 
a 8 -0.251 [.004] -0.809 [.000] 
a 9 -0.180 [.007] 0.525 [.001] 
b0 3.331 [.000] 3.448 [.000] 
b2 0.360 [.000] 0.356 [.000] 
b3 -0.005 [.000] -0.006 [.000] 
b4 0.353 [.000] 0.318 [.000] 
b5 -0.019 [.454] -0.071 [.008] 
1/η 1974 0.428 [.000] 0.430 [.000] 
1/η 1975-76 0.427 [.000] 0.428 [.000] 
1/η 1977-78 0.436 [.000] 0.437 [.000] 
1/η 1979-80 0.429 [.000] 0.431 [.000] 
1/η 1981-82 0.424 [.000] 0.425 [.000] 
1/η 1983-84 0.425 [.000] 0.427 [.000] 
1/η 1985-86 0.427 [.000] 0.428 [.000] 
1/η 1987-88 0.433 [.000] 0.435 [.000] 
1/η 1989-90 0.421 [.000] 0.423 [.000] 
1/η 1991-92 0.417 [.000] 0.420 [.000] 
1/η 1993-94 0.434 [.000] 0.437 [.000] 
1/η 1995-96 0.453 [.000] 0.455 [.000] 
1/η 1997-98 0.461 [.000] 0.463 [.000] 
1/η 1999-00 0.466 [.000] 0.468 [.000] 
R2 for (7) 0.980 0.975   
R2 for (8) 0.964 0.966  
R2 for (9) 0.939  0.939   
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Table 5.  Effects on the Degree of Competition 
 
 Basic equation  GDP & INFLATION 
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
constant 0.426 [.015] 0.074 [.184]
BTRADE -1.87x10-9 [.021] -1.544 x10-9 [.025]
FREEDEP 0.056 [.441] 0.012 [.832]
SEGDUM -0.011 [.861] 0.063 [.261]
CIX -0.003 [.108]
GDP -0.379 [.637]
INFL 1.294 [.003]
HI 0.161 [.419] 0.167 [.369]
REGDUM 0.294 [.000] 0.293 [.000]
Adjusted R2 0.682 0.724 
 
Note:  Equation (10),  
,)( 6,543,210, ktktttttkttk REGDUMHIINFLandGDPorCIXSEGDUMFREEDEPBTRADE αααααααθ ++++++=
is run by Ordinary Least Squares to find the magnitude of the effects of the variables on the degree 
of competition.  The number of observations is 54.  For a definition of the explanatory variables, 
refer to the main text. 
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Figure 1.  Loan Interest Rate 
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Note: Average contracted interest rates on loans of all banks are shown. 
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Figure 2.  Estimates of tθ  for city banks  
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Note: MVR estimates of tθ  in Table 2 are shown with their 95% confidence interval.  Line of 1/n corresponds to Cournot oligopoly, and line at zero 
to perfect competition.
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Figure 3.  Estimates of tθ  for regional banks 
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Note: MVR estimates of tθ  in Table 3 are shown with their 95% confidence interval.  Line of 1/n corresponds to Cournot oligopoly, line at zero to 
perfect competition, and line at unity to joint profit maximization. 
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Figure 4.  Estimates of tθ  for city banks, with dr  in eq. (8) being the cost of capital  
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Note:  MVR estimates of tθ  for city banks are shown with their 95% confidence interval.  While dr  in eq. (8) is the deposit interest rate in Figures 
2 and 3, the cost of capital is used for the data of dr  in the estimation of this Figure. 
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Figure 5.  Estimates of tθ  for regional banks, with dr  in eq. (8) being the cost of capital  
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Note:  MVR estimates of tθ  of regional banks are shown with their 95% confidence interval.  While dr  in eq. (8) is the deposit interest rate in 
Figures 2 and 3, the cost of capital is used for the data of dr  in the estimation of this Figure. 
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Figure 6.  Estimates of tθ  for regional banks: bank reserves are considered in eq. (8)’ 
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Note:  Results based on the simultaneous MVR estimation of eqs. (7), (8)’, and (9) are shown. 
